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Abstract We take advantage of the fact that for the Austrian SILC 2008–2011, two data
sources are available in parallel for the same households: register-based and survey-based
income data. Thus, we aim to explain which households tend to under- or over-report their
household income by estimating multinomial logit and OLS models with covariates
referring to the interview situation, employment status and socio-demographic household
characteristics. Furthermore, we analyze source-specific differences in the distribution of
household income and how these differences affect aggregate poverty indicators based on
household income. The analysis reveals an increase in the cross-sectional poverty rates for
2008–2011 and the longitudinal poverty rate if register data rather than survey data are
used. These changes in the poverty rate are mainly driven by differences in employment
income rather than sampling weights and other income components. Regression results
show a pattern of mean-reverting errors when comparing household income between the
two data sources. Furthermore, differences between data sources for both under-reporting
and over-reporting slightly decrease with the number of panel waves in which a household
participated. Among the other variables analyzed that are related to the interview situation
(mode, proxy, interview month), only the number of proxy interviews was (weakly)
positively correlated with the difference between data sources, although this outcome was
not robust over different model specifications.
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1 Introduction and Review of the Literature
The policy relevance of social indicators has risen with the latest financial and economic
crisis. They were awarded a prominent status in European politics with the European
Commission’s Europe 2020-target for social inclusion (2010) and before that the Laeken
indicator set on social inclusion (2001). The European Community Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) are one of the pillars of social statistics in the European
Statistical System and the most relevant household survey at the European level in the field
of household income, living standards and poverty. Several indicators of social inclusion,
amongst them the Europe 2020-target for the ‘‘risk of poverty or social exclusion’’, are
calculated annually on the basis of this source.
Being so highly recognized, those indicators are expected to fulfil high statistical
standards concerning reliability, validity and comparability (both over time and between
countries). The evaluation of measurement error in this context is therefore crucial. In our
paper, we focus on the measurement of household income in EU-SILC and investigate
differences between data collected using surveys and data collected from registers. For this
purpose, we take advantage of the fact, that for the Austrian EU-SILC of 2008–2011, both
register- and survey-based income data are available for the same observational units.1
Using the differences in these measurements for households at the micro level, we aim to
provide explanations for changes in different income-based poverty indicators by inves-
tigating the underlying changes in the distribution of household income as a consequence
of using register data. First, by estimating multinomial logit and linear models with
covariates referring to the income and employment structure, the interview situation (e.g.
CATI vs. CAPI) and other household characteristics, we try to explain whether certain
types of households tend to under- or over-report their household income when asked via
the survey method. Second, we ask which component (income type, weighting) contributes
most to the change in the poverty measurement if register data are used instead of survey
data.
1.1 Differences Between Register and Survey Data, Measurement Error
and Its Impact on Poverty
The identification of data errors requires by definition some a point of reference to judge
the accuracy of the information. In most cases, administrative data are proclaimed to be the
benchmark. Bound et al. (2001) distinguish between micro-level and macro-level valida-
tion studies for assessing measurement error. Micro-level validation studies usually define
measurement error as the difference between the value recorded in administrative records
and the value observed in the survey. Macro-level validation studies, in contrast, compare
population parameters, such as income inequality or the sum of earnings, derived from the
survey to official reports based on administrative records or to estimates obtained from a
comparable survey. Existing studies on measurement error are mostly done for the US
population and with a focus on personal or market income.
Mean-reverting errors with low earnings inflated and high earnings underreported are a
common finding in such studies (Bound et al. 2001; Gottschalk and Huynh 2010; Kim and
1 The terms ‘‘register data’’ is used in this paper for income data that come from administrative sources, i.e.
their intended purpose was not the statistical use but some other general or specific demand in the
administration of a public body. We refer to it synonymously with ‘‘administrative data’’. They are thus to
be distinguished from data derived from a survey based on questionnaires (‘‘survey data’’ SD).
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Tamborini 2012, 2014). Income volatility and income structure also matter: based on a
survey sample for a developing country, Akke (2011) found that prior earnings volatility
strongly affects measurement error in the current period. Moreover, there is evidence for a
positive correlation between measurement error and the number of different income
sources in the household (Moore et al. 2000).
Besides income-related variables, studies have also shown the importance of the survey
duration and survey mode. In longitudinal studies, panel participants’ responses may
increasingly begin to differ from their initial responses to the same survey questions due to
learning effects in answering a complex questionnaire and/or by an improved personal
relationship between respondent and (the same) interviewer (Sikkel and Hoogendoorn
2008; Chadi 2013). Such effects have been found for questions on life satisfaction (Frick
et al. 2006; Landua 1992) and for subjective mental health (Wooden and Li 2014). For
income, however, a longer participation in a panel does not necessarily result in higher
accuracy. Measurement errors for income are usually found to be positively serially cor-
related in such studies for the US population (Pischke 1995; Bound and Krueger 1991).
Whether this also applies for representative survey data for a population sample in a
European country will be investigated in our paper.
Mode effects refer to the type of interaction between interviewer and interviewee.
Existing studies focus on differences between CATI and CAPI and on the relevance of
proxy interviews for income measurement error. The literature has shown that respondents
to CATI are more likely to present socially desirable responses (Beland and St-Pierre 2007;
Groves et al. 2009; Holbrook et al. 2003). A study for Austria found that telephone
interviews lead to a larger downward bias concerning income inequality (Fessler et al.
2013). For proxy interviews, however, a more ambivalent picture emerges (Brown et al.
2001; Tourangeau et al. 2000). On the one hand, proxy interviews may enhance data
quality because there is less social desirability pressure and thus a lower likelihood of
mean-reverting errors. On the other hand, income of other household members can easily
be overlooked due to recall error or interview fatigue. Some (and mostly older) studies
have found only little proxy bias in earnings (Bound and Krueger 1991), whereas more
recent studies show that proxy interviews bias earnings downwards (Reynolds and Wenger
2012) and their effect also interacts with demographic variables (Tamborini and Kim
2013).
Furthermore, differences in income inequality are observed when survey and register
data are compared: Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) discuss the implications of measurement
error in surveys on earnings income inequality. By matching the US Survey of Income and
Program Participation to tax data, they find that income inequality is 20% higher in the
register data. Based on a random sample from the Danish population, Kreiner et al. (2013)
compare a one-shot recall question on total personal income (employment income, pension
income, social transfers) with the corresponding tax records of the respondents. The
authors find a lower mean and a lager spread for the survey measure.
A smaller number of studies are concerned with total household income and the con-
sequences of using register data instead of survey data for the calculation of household
income and poverty indicators. The studies available also differ in their validation
methodology. In sum, the measurement error of income has been shown to affect cross-
sectional poverty rates (Nordberg et al. 2001; Figari et al. 2012), poverty dynamics
(Rendtel et al. 1998; McGarry 1995; Breen and Moisio 2004; Worts et al. 2010) and
statistical relationships of poverty indicators with other variables (Lohmann 2011).
Nordberg et al. (2001) found that income estimates derived from administrative records are
quite reliable and generally higher than surveyed income, except for very low register
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incomes. They interpreted the differences observed as being mainly due to measurement
errors in the interview data. Their results showed that survey data produced higher
inequality and poverty estimates than register data. Lohmann (2011) makes use of
between-country differences concerning data sources for income variables (register or
survey data). Results show that the degree of consistency between earnings and employ-
ment status (i.e. no earnings reported if the status is non-working) is on average lower in
register countries; this also impacts on the poverty rate conditional on activity status in
some countries. The author concludes that the relationship between employment status and
poverty status also depends on the data collection approach used. Figari et al. (2012)
compare empirical estimates of income distribution and poverty rates based on
microsimulation methods with observed survey-data-based estimates. The authors use
simulated estimates in their model in accordance with prevailing rules on liability and
eligibility in four European countries. On the one hand, their results show that poverty
rates, defined as the number of people with equalized incomes less than 60% of the
national median, which use reported data are slightly higher than those calculated using
simulated incomes. On the other hand, there was an overlap of 75% for both approaches.
1.2 Characteristics of Register Data and Implementation in EU-SILC
Assuming register data to be a less error-prone source for validating survey questions on
income, however, may not always be justified (Abowd and Stinson 2013; Kapteyn and
Ypma 2007) and depends on the context of data production. Since administrative registers
are not initially built to answer certain research questions, they should not be expected to
provide perfect statistical data (United Nations 2007; Wallgren and Wallgren 2007; Zhang
2011). Abowd and Stinson (2013) identify three potential causes for deviations from
survey data which must not be confounded with different levels of measurement error: a)
definitional differences between survey and register data—like taxable income relevant for
a wage-tax register versus actual disposable income from a standard-of-living perspective;
b) errors in administrative data itself (e.g. coverage issues and updating intervals) and c)
and mistakes in the matching process of multiple data sources.
In the European Statistical System, common definitions and methods have been agreed
upon in order to facilitate the comparability of poverty indicators and income between
countries. EU-SILC2 comprises several variables of personal and household income
components and is conducted in all 28 member countries plus several more.3 In cooper-
ation with the National Statistical Institutes (NSI), Eurostat aims to maximize the com-
parability of indicators across the participating countries through the output harmonization
of variables (i.e. providing/developing explicit conceptual definitions of what to measure,
namely so-called ‘‘target variables’’, as opposed to specifications of how to measure them)
and agreements on various methodological aspects like sampling, weighting and precision
requirements. However, whereas detailed rules for the content of variables and the con-
struction of those indicators exist, the source of income data—amongst other parameters—
is up to the Member States. As a consequence, some countries mainly use official registers,
whereas other countries mostly (have to) rely on survey data to fill specific income
components. Thus, the heterogeneity of the data sources is something of an obstacle to
2 For more information on the survey see the Eurostat Website under the link http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
web/income-and-living-conditions/overview (accessed on Sep. 12, 2016).
3 Namely: Norway, Island, Turkey, Switzerland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia.
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their comparability, though it may lead to a good overall level of data quality in the
outcome indicators.
When EU-SILC started in 2004, only few countries were using registers; but nowadays
ever more Member States are making the step towards integrating register data into their
SILC data collections. Studies investigating the impact of register use on measurement
error are therefore vital. To¨rma¨lehto (2013) draws four main conclusions for the context of
EU-SILC4:
1. Integrating register data in a data collection may affect multiple phases of a survey
process: sampling and weighting (as new information from registers can be used e.g. to
design the sample), non-response analysis, calibration of weights, survey designs (as
the potential for dropping questions from the survey may alter the whole ‘‘flow’’),
processing and quality control, imputation, dissemination and documentation.
2. It is challenging to generalise about quality of registers in a cross-national context.
3. There is a lot of variation concerning the particular data sources for specific variables.
Register data may originate from survey-like data collections (e.g. self-administered
questionnaires) but also from entirely electronic exchanges of administrative data.
4. The combined use of survey and register data affects the total survey error (Groves
et al. 2009), and expands the traditional survey error sources to those related to
registers. To explain this, To¨rma¨lehto (2013) also cites Zhang (2011), who proposed
an addition to Groves’ Total Surveys Error model. While Groves’ ideas were designed
for the context of (sampled) survey data, Zhang (2011) further develops and applies
them to error sources associated with register data (e.g. problems of conceptualization,
measurement, and accuracy). Zhang proposes a ‘‘two-phase life cycle of integrated
statistical micro data’’ where the first phase concerns the data from each single source,
and the second the integration of data from different sources. Register data could be
used as a benchmark against which survey data could be compared to estimate the
magnitude and predictors of measurement error in a given country. However, it should
not be expected that register data themselves are not prone to (other) sources of error
and that the combination of register and survey data leads to perfect statistical data—
on the contrary: ‘‘At the present stage, there is still clearly a lack of statistical theories
for assessing the quality of such register-based statistics.’’ (Zhang 2011: 446). In sum,
there could be more sources of error when using register data, but usually the
expectation is to have a lower total error due to fewer measurement errors.
1.3 Effects of Register Data Use in EU-SILC: A Comparative Perspective
Some countries have a longer history of register data use than others, mostly for legal and
administrative reasons: Denmark, Finland, Island, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and
Slovenia are those that started with administrative data in SILC right away (i.e. from
2004/05). Then there are those who joined in more recently: Italy gradually since 2004,
France since 2008, Austria since 2012, and Spain since 2013. Although the ‘‘old’’ register
countries encountered the same challenges,5 we focus on those countries that have made
the transition from survey income in more recent years and therefore have SILC waves
with different income sources to compare.
4 Summary of the 2012 Workshop on Registers in the context of EU-SILC presented at the EU-SILC Task
Force Legal Revision meeting in February 2013.
5 Cf. the work done in CHINTEX on data of the ECHP, e.g. Nordberg et al. (2001).
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In Spain, the new methodology, where register and survey income information is
combined, is considered a more comprehensive method of collecting income in lower and
in higher parts of the distribution (Me´ndez 2015). Income levels are significantly higher
than when using the survey approach but inequality indicators, like the risk of poverty,
remain similar. Similarly, the French experience (Burricand 2013) showed that the change
in methodology did not have a significant impact on the poverty rate, while other inequality
indicators increased. Differences between the two income sources—registers versus sur-
veys—were more important in the extremes of the distribution than in the mid-range, and
for some income components (pensions) than others (wages). In Italy (Consolini and
Donatiello 2013), the inclusion of register data produced a substantial increase in the
estimate of average income among self-employed earners, while the increase for
employees was less pronounced. At the same time, the use of a mixed data-collection
strategy versus survey data only resulted in a substantial decrease in the risk of poverty and
Gini coefficient. Only about half of all persons were at risk of poverty according to both
methodologies; the others had a different status with each methodology.
1.4 Conclusions Drawn from the Literature Review
To sum up, the prevailing literature in the field highlights the following problems related to
measurement error in income: (a) errors explained by data collection methods (e.g. type of
question—yearly vs. current, simple vs. complex; source for income variables—register or
survey or any combination of both); (b) problems caused by panel design and relevant for
measuring poverty dynamics correctly; and (c) challenges concerning cross-country
comparisons. Furthermore, two main conclusions can be derived from existing SILC
studies and similar surveys: (1) the effect of register data is generally more visible in the
lower and upper extremes of the household income distributions and varies for different
income components; (2) the effect of register data use on income inequality and poverty
indicators varies between countries.
We add to the literature in several aspects. All of the studies on household income and
poverty indicators discussed above use either microsimulation or some variant of Markov
modelling to capture measurement error. In this paper, survey data is directly validated
against register data at a micro level. Moreover, the consequences of deviations for esti-
mating poverty indicators are investigated. The focus of the analysis lies on equivalised
household income. Additionally, studies that report on situations where consent from
sampled individuals is necessary to link a survey with register data—as in the US—do not
apply in our case, as giving or withdrawing consent introduces a further burden and
potential bias. Seeking respondents’ consent is not legally required in Austria for a vol-
untary survey like SILC. This allows for a more complete comparison of survey and
register data across the income distribution and socio-demographic groups. This article
thus aims to pave the way to a better understanding of the specifics for Austria and to
contribute to a more comprehensive picture in EU-SILC and other large European surveys.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the development
and specifics of register use for SILC in Austria as well as the context of the re-calculation
of household incomes for 2008–2011. It then goes on to illustrate the household income
concept and its components. Section 3 describes how the analysis addresses the main
research questions. The fourth section is divided into two parts. The first part illustrates the
effects of the data switch on the aggregate poverty rate and the underlying statics of the
distribution of household income. In the second part, the results of both cross-sectional (for
2010) and longitudinal (2008–2011) regression models for the observed income
S. Angel et al.
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differences are discussed. The robustness of the main results is further evaluated against
different model specifications and statistical tests. The outcomes of these tests are sum-
marized in the fifth section. Section 6 concludes and describes limitations of the current
study and suggestions for further research.
2 Data
2.1 Register Use in the Austrian EU-SILC
SILC Austria was launched in 2003. At that time, income components were exclusively
collected through surveys (CAPI, voluntary participation). Since 2008 CATI interviews
have been used for the panel part of the survey. Survey data for particular income com-
ponents were first substituted by register data in 2012 (Heuberger et al. 2013). The main
reasons for gradually switching to register data were quality and response burden con-
siderations.6 Together with the Federal Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer
Protection, Statistics Austria decided to recalculate and revise income data for 2008–2011
using administrative registers. One main target was to shift the break in time series of the
EU 2020 Social Inclusion Indicators further back to the baseline year 2008, resulting in
parallel data for the same respondents for 2008–2011. In this paper, we compare the
Austrian EU-SILC data from 2008 to 2011 before and after that revision. The sample size
ranges between 13,621 and 14,085 individuals nested in around 5700–6100 households in
these years.
Austrian law stipulates that the linkage of personal micro data from surveys with
registers be done using an anonymized personal identifier (bPK). However, unlike in
many other countries including the USA, it is not necessary to seek consent of the
interviewee for the linkage procedure.7 In order to identify individuals in the admin-
istrative datasets, the personal identifier of people covered by the survey is required.
Usually, this information is collected as part of the sampling procedure. The share of
identifiers found for the total population in the survey varies over time but generally
decreases the farther back the survey year is. For the years analyzed here it ranges
between 96% (2008) and 99% (2011). However, there are always individuals who turn
out to be actual household members but are not covered by the sampling frame (mainly
because they are not officially registered at a particular household’s address). Their
linkage key is missing ex ante and must be retrieved by a procedure involving the
Federal Ministry for the Interior. For 2008–2011 missing keys most often occur among
younger people, persons living in Vienna8 (capital) and persons with non-Austrian
citizenship. With the exception of EU-SILC 2011, the proportion of missing keys for
women was higher than for men among all age groups (by about 1 percentage point).
As a consequence, using register data results in an under-reporting of income data for
those groups. Most households with a reported household income of zero Euros receive
6 Verordnung des Bundesministers fu¨r Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz u¨ber die Statistik der
Einkommen und Lebensbedingungen, BGBl. II Nr. 277/2010.
7 Instead, persons and households participating in EU-SILC in Austria do so on a completely voluntary
basis and are thoroughly informed about data linkage.
8 The reason here is that the inhabitants of Vienna more often have a non-Austrian background (country of
birth or citizenship) and are therefore more likely to have a missing identifier.
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an imputed income during the data editing process.9 However, for unlinked individuals
in households with linkable people the under-reporting remains, resulting in household
incomes that are too low on average.
Register data use affects both (1) the sources of the household income and (2)
weighting. For the calculation of sample weights10 the wage tax income (number of
recipients of income from employment and pensions) was used as a new marginal dis-
tribution to improve the consistency of the results compared to the income tax register
(distribution of income) and to even out selective nonresponse bias for certain groups.
2.2 Measuring Household Income and Poverty in EU-SILC
Total household income in EU-SILC is calculated as the sum of earned income, capital
gains, pensions and public social transfers minus taxes and social security contributions
plus the net flow of (paid/received) alimonies and other (paid/received) private transfers
between households (UNECE 2011). Equivalised household income is defined as a
household’s disposable income divided by the sum of consumption equivalents of that
household using the modified OECD scale to reflect economies of scale: for each house-
hold the first adult receives a weight of 1, each additional adult gets a weight of 0.5 and
each (additional) child under 14 years receives a weight of 0.3. The poverty indicator is
based on the distribution of the equivalised household income. If it is below 60% of the
median of its distribution, a household and all of its members are defined as poor. The
poverty rate refers to the weighted percentage of people in poverty in a population.
Table 1 provides an overview of the data source for each income variable for 2010
before and after the revision. Income components highlighted in grey were derived from
registers for the revision.11 Some variables are exclusively based on survey data due to
the unavailability of register data sources or because of methodological reasons (e.g. the
time lag for receiving final data for self-employment income PY050 is too long). When
speaking of ‘‘register based household income’’ in this paper we refer to the revised
household income compiled from this combination of register and survey data. However,
we argue that this is sufficiently justified as the sum of all components from register data
is rather high as percentage of the total amount (between 86.4% in 2011 and 87.5% in
2010).
Income from employment and family benefits are most common, with approximately
50% of the population receiving each of these types of income (Table 1).12 In general, the
total weighted sum of household income captured by surveys is markedly lower than the
register data. Furthermore, registers show a noticeably higher share of recipients of
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and employee income.
9 This applies to households in which it is not possible to link any person to register data as well as for
persons without any employee income, pension income or unemployment income based on the monthly
main activity status.
10 General aspects of weighting are described in the Quality Reports publicly available on the CIRCA
platform https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp (09/05/2016).
11 However, due to register data limitations for some income components like family/children-related
allowances (HY050), both survey and register data had to be used.
12 After changing the data source for some individuals, a particular component is no longer observed (=0),
whereas for others an entry[0 can now be found in the registers. Thus, Table 1 represents the net outcome
of these ‘inflows’ and ‘outflows’.
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3 Methods and Hypotheses
3.1 Steps of the Analysis
The analysis comprises two main parts. The first part (Sect. 4.1) examines the factors that
explain the observed differences in equivalised household income between register and
survey data. Second, as the total household income is the source for calculating the poverty
rate we then go on (Sect. 4.2) to investigate how the poverty rate and other income
statistics are affected if the data source for income components is changed from surveys to
registers.
For 56.5% of individuals (57.5% of all households) a negative difference (sur-
vey\ register) for equivalised household income is found, whereas a positive deviation
Table 1 Calculation of the total household income in EU-SILC 2010










? PY010 Employee cash/near cash incomea 75.727 73.984 57.9 55.7
? PY050 Cash benefits/losses from self-employment 11.04 11.338
? PY090 Unemployment benefitsa 3.291 2.771 12.6 9.7
? PY100 Old-age benefitsa 30.14 29.849 25.3 25.2
? PY110 Survivor benefitsa 0.568 0.571 1.3 1.1
? PY120 Sickness benefitsa 0.538 0.461 5.9 3.2
? PY130 Disability benefitsa 2.932 2.246 3.7 2.6
? PY140 Education-related allowances 0.303 0.301
? PY080 Pension from individual private plans 0.144 0.138
= Sum of personal incomes 124.683 121.659
? HY040 Income from rental of a property or land 2.062 2.060
? HY050 Family/children-related allowancesa 5.782 6.133 48.3 50.3
? HY060 Social exclusion benefits not elsewhere
classified
0.356 0.366
? HY070 Housing allowances 0.314 0.317
? HY080 Regular inter-household cash transfer
received
1.227 1.224
? HY090 Interest, dividends, profit from capital
investments in unincorporated business
1.740 1.741
? HY110 Income received by people aged under 16a 0.103 0.096 1.9 1.8
= Sum of household incomes 11.583 11.937
– HY130 Regular inter-household cash transfer paid 1.564 1.573
– HY145 Repayments/receipts for tax adjustmenta -0.787 -0.620 5.4 6.4
= HY020 Total disposable household income 135.488 132.643
Statistics Austria, EU-SILC 2010. Weighted results. a Income components based on register data. b Rates for
personal income components (‘‘PY ….’’) are calculated for persons aged[15 only. Values include impu-
tations. Differences for non-register variables are due to weights based on register data. Full tables for all
years are available in the online supplementary materials (Tables A1–A3)
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(register[ survey) occurs for 42.8% of all individuals (41% of the households). Plotting
means and medians of these observed differences along twenty income percentiles based
on register data shows a clear tendency among higher-income groups to under-report/
underestimate their income and vice versa for lower-income groups (Fig. 1). This pattern is
more systematic for under-reporting than for over-reporting.13
Differences between survey data and register data are regarded as measurement error.
We differentiate between two main explanations for measurement error (Bound et al.
2001): social desirability (aka interviewer bias; Groves et al. 2009) and cognitive errors
(misunderstanding, retrieval and calculation problems). The multivariate analysis in
Sect. 4.1 takes a closer look at this issue. By including (and thus controlling for) other
possible determinants, we aim to investigate whether social desirability or cognitive error
is more relevant as the mechanism behind the observed income differences between data
sources.
The multivariate analysis uses three types of regression models. First, separate multi-
nomial logit models (with alternative-invariant regressors) are estimated (Cameron and
Trivedi 2005: 500). The dependent variable has three categories that mirror three groups of
Fig. 1 Weighted data. Median and mean of absolute deviation for equivalised household income for 20
quantiles derived from registers (2010). Persons are units of observation: b N = 8078, c N = 5913. Figure 4
in the ‘‘Appendix’’ contains the difference between data sources if equivalised household incomes are
measured in logs. This procedure takes into account the current level of income and illustrates the relative
deviation. A similar pattern then occurs, although the deviation in the upper tail of the distribution is
markedly lower
13 These patterns are very similar in all years observed (see Figure A1–A4 in the online supplementary
materials).
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households for which odds-ratios, conditional on socio-economic characteristics14 and
some survey mode aspects (see the next section), are estimated. It is coded ‘‘0’’ if the
relative deviation15 of the survey income from the register income lies within the range of
0.95–1.05 (‘‘almost perfect identity’’16—reference category); ‘‘1’’ if above 1.05 (‘‘over-
reporting’’) and ‘‘2’’ if below 0.95 (‘‘under-reporting’’).
Second, we also take a direct look at the magnitude of metric differences of equivalised
household income between data sources and estimate OLS models with the same set of
explanatory variables as in the previous step. This also makes it possible to alter the
functional form of the regression between explanatory variables and income differences.
We present specifications where both the income from registers (independent variable) and
the difference between surveys and registers (dependent variable) are measured in absolute
terms (Table 2; models 2, 5) and natural logs (Table 2; models 3, 6). The latter estimates
coefficients that represent the effect of a 1% change in the independent variable on the
corresponding %-change of the dependent variable. Wald tests of the null hypothesis that
the two alternatives (over-reporting vs. under-reporting) can be combined for all pairs of
alternatives were rejected.17 Thus, positive and negative differences are modelled sepa-
rately. Negative absolute differences (survey\ register), however, have been converted to
positive values to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients.
Third, the panel dimension of our dataset is exploited by applying panel regression
models with household fixed effects and time fixed effects. Due to the focus on within-
household change over time (as compared to between-household differences in the cross-
section), panel regression models allow controlling for household characteristics that are
not observed in the dataset but are constant over time (e.g. cognitive ability of all
household members or past experience with surveys). This helps to increase the consis-
tency of the estimates and decrease a (possible) selection bias for the independent vari-
able(s) under investigation (Hsiao 2014).
Data for SILC Austria come from a representative probability sample that involves
stratification (based on federal states and interviewer regions) and features households as
the primary sampling unit (Glaser and Till 2010). We consider these complex sampling
design features by applying STATA’s survey procedure to our regression estimation
commands (Kreuter and Valliant 2007). This also implicates the use of sampling weights
for all cross-sectional analyses (descriptive statistics and regression models). Households
are the units of observation in all regression models. In the cross-sectional regression
analysis, we focus on the year 2010 as this is the most recent year available with a high
share of successful links of person-specific IDs to their register entries (97%) and where the
data source differs for maximum number of income components.18 Full tables for all years
are provided in the online supplementary materials.
14 Table A4 in the online supplementary materials provides an overview of the share of over- and under-
reporting individuals from different social groups for the year 2010.
15 Relative deviation = (income from survey - income from register)/(income from register).
16 This bandwidth was chosen as there are hardly any households for which a perfectly identical equivalised
income between the two data sources is observed (Table 5 in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
17 Tables are available from the authors upon request.
18 In EU-SILC 2011, pension incomes were already derived from registers before the back-calculation.
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3.2 Modelling Household Income Differences: Explanatory Variables
and Hypotheses
The main focus of the regression models is on the effect of equivalised household income
taken from registers on over-/under-reporting. Based on the social desirability argument, it
is expected that households with low incomes tend to report a higher income than they
actually have. On the other hand, households with a higher income are expected to make
themselves ‘‘poorer’’ in the interview situation. In the multivariate analysis we aim to
control for variables that are correlated with income and the observed measurement error.
This allows to adjust the observed effect of income on measurement error (Fig. 1) for those
dimensions that are related to cognitive error (e.g. number of income components, job
changes) or other interview effects (e.g. no. of years in the panel). If there remains a
significant effect of income on over-reporting/under-reporting, this could ceteris paribus be
interpreted as evidence for social desirability bias related to the level of income. Fur-
thermore, we test whether effects that are found in the literature for mode variables but for
different samples or different types of income (Sect. 1.1) are also present in the SILC data.
The remaining explanatory variables in the models can be differentiated into four
groups. The first group is related to the structure of the household income. It is expected
that households with a lower number of different income sources (see Table 1 for all
components) should have a less complex income situation and thus be less likely to have
measurement error (see Sect. 1.1). Moreover, we assume an underlying social norm that
makes poverty undesirable (Bosma et al. 2015; Sutton et al. 2014; Walker et al. 2013) and
thus hypothesize that a lower level of satisfaction with household income increases the
likelihood of over-reporting. As different income components represent different propor-
tions of the total household income (Table 1) and also different magnitudes of measure-
ment error,19 we also include a categorical variable which captures the income source with
the highest share of total household income.
The second group of variables is related to employment status. Main employment status
refers to the selected respondent for household variables (according to the interview
guidelines in SILC). Changes in the main employment status during the income reference
period are aggregated over all household members. In addition to the number of different
income sources, these two variables can serve as a proxy for how much fluctuation occurs
in yearly income streams which could make recall problems more probable. Thus, it is
expected that retirees and people who mainly do housework have the lowest likelihood of
misreporting. Similarly, households with a higher number of changes in labor status are
expected to be more likely to have measurement error. The direction of effects for these
variables is assumed to be the same, regardless of whether they are positive or negative
deviations.
The third group of explanatory factors contains information on the interview situ-
ation: the total number of proxy interviews, a binary indicator which indicates whether
the household was surveyed with CATI (rather than CAPI), the interview month and
how often the household has already participated in SILC. The discussion of existing
studies (Sect. 1.1) has shown that the evidence for the effects of proxy interviews on
income measurement error is mixed and may depend on whether (lower) social
desirability or recall problems are the main driver behind the effect. We thus do not
assume any ex-ante hypothesis for proxy interviews. Based on the literature review, it
19 In 2010, the median of the relative deviation [(survey minus register)/register 9 100] amounts to 16%
(employee income), 52% (unemployment benefits), 9% (old-age benefits).
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is also ambivalent whether there will be less income measurement error in our data set
with an increasing number of panels rounds a household participated. However, we
expect that a longer distance between the interview month and the last income refer-
ence year is generally associated with a higher likelihood of reporting errors due to
recall problems. Concerning mode effects, the literature has demonstrated that
respondents to CATI are more likely to present socially desirable answers and that this
can lead to a downward bias concerning income inequality (Sect. 1.1). Furthermore,
CATI does not allow the use of visual aids may leave the respondent less time to check
income records resulting in an enhanced likelihood of cognitive error. Thus, CATI is
expected to increase measurement error in general and to be associated with both more
over- and under-reporting than CAPI.
The fourth group of explanatory factors comprises socio-demographic characteris-
tics. These mainly serve as control variables for income. Thus, we do not make any
assumptions on their effects. Furthermore, consistent evidence for some socio-demo-
graphic variables (e.g. sex, children in the household) is lacking (Bound et al. 2001).
Age and sex refer to the response person for household variables in SILC. Education
measures the highest completed level of education in the household. Health is mea-
sured as the household’s median of an ordinal variable capturing the self-assessed
health of all household members over the age of 15. Household structure and popu-
lation size at the place of residence are measured directly at the household level.
4 Results
4.1 Explaining Household Income Differences
The primary focus of this section is on the effects of income, income-related variables
(income satisfaction, income structure, employment status variables) and the interview
context (e.g. mode). We do not comment in detail on the outcomes for the remaining socio-
demographic variables as they mainly serve as controls in the models (see Sect. 3.2).
4.1.1 Negative Deviations (Under-Reporting)
From Table 2 it is evident that, even after controlling for a variety of other variables, both
the likelihood of under-reporting (compared to a close identity of incomes) and the
magnitude of under-reporting significantly increase with rising register income. This
outcome is stable for all four years. For instance, a one percent increase in equivalised
household income raises the odds of reporting a lower income than actually found in
administrative records by a factor of 3.667 (column 4). Every additional available Euro
increases the difference between data sources in this group by approximately 22 cents
(column 5). Similarly, a one percent increase in personal income raises this difference by
almost 2 percent (column 6).
In the multinomial logit models (column 4), other statistically significant effects are
found for households with the main income source coming from self-employment or
private sources (as compared with those receiving old-age benefits). Increasing satisfaction
with the household income lowers the odds for under-reporting compared to approximate
equivalence between data sources. If the main activity status of the person answering the
household questionnaire is housework, this raises the odds of under-reporting. A change in
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Table 2 Results from cross-sectional regression models (2010)
















Ln(Epinc) 0.244*** -0.489*** 3.654*** 1.983***
Epinc -0.299*** 0.223***





1.228*** 981.1*** 0.220*** 0.830*** -942.1*** -0.156***
Main income:
employed




0.790 2217.6* 0.591 0.239*** -1966.1 -0.823***
Main income:
social transfers
1.049 2786.0*** 0.531 1.162 738.7 -0.0332
Main income: old-
age benefits
Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Main income:
other private




1.034 -377.9* -0.0345 1.026 -292.7* -0.0149
Activity statusb:
full time work
Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Activity status:
part time work
0.845 -742.7 -0.0647 1.190 381.4 0.0129
Activity status:
unemployed
0.682 -3039.4*** -0.392* 1.817** 1133.3** 0.331*
Activity status:
retired
0.849 -1076.0 -0.0826 0.949 137.2 -0.174
Activity status:
student, other
0.462** -5359.2*** -0.426* 1.383 2218.5** 0.569**
Activity status:
housework




1.258 -159.0 0.0395 0.809 -1745.5*** -0.154
Employ. status
changes: none
Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Employ. status
changes: 1
1.464*** 6.807 0.221** 1.383** 727.4* 0.147*
Employ. status
changes:[1
1.843* -174.2 0.462** 1.794* 817.6 0.295*
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Table 2 continued
















Age 0.968* 45.93** 0.00202 1.001 -20.04 -0.0169
Age squared 1.000* 1.000 0.000179*
Male Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.




0.978 -80.02 0.00324 1.062 68.11 0.0323
Education: basic 1 0 0 1 0 0
Education: middle 1.415** 1104.7** 0.338** 0.874 -643.3 -0.119
Education: high 1.419* 1750.6*** 0.437*** 0.707* -1884.3*** -0.346***
Education:
specialized
1.755*** 4251.6*** 0.683*** 0.805 -2871.6*** -0.275**
Retired household 0.678 82.35 0.156 0.921 1391.5 -0.281
Single HH, not
retired
0.652** -1891.1* -0.312** 1.026 1485.8** 0.195**
MPH, no children Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Single parent 0.393*** -2706.5** -0.740*** 0.803 1562.5* 0.0734





Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
[100,000
inhabitants
1.113 -491.2 -0.0374 1.171 122.8 0.138
[10,000
inhabitants
1.011 -354.4 -0.128 1.205 -387.5 0.0374
B10,000
inhabitants
1.045 -1003.0* -0.139 1.129 187.3 0.159**
CAPI Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
CATI 1.046 482.2 0.142 0.936 -325.9 -0.0562
Sum of proxy
interviews in hh
1.199* 12.81 0.0871 1.159* 139.6 0.0795
Interview month 1.030 -129.9 0.00267 1.036 164.2* 0.0216
SILC round 1 Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
SILC round 2 0.999 -637.2 -0.0895 1.002 -477.2 -0.111
SILC round 3 0.896 -2255.7*** -0.357*** 1.008 -36.69 -0.0338
SILC round 4 0.858 -1597.9*** -0.204 1.079 -219.8 -0.111
Constant 4592.0* 10.83*** 1231.5 -11.25***
R2 (OLS models) 0.166 0.146 0.689 0.345
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the labor status of the household also increases the odds of under-reporting, as does being
unemployed.
The evidence for variables related to the interview context is mixed. A higher number of
proxy interviews increases the odds of under-reporting, whereas the effects of CATI are
statistically not significant.
The results of the OLS models (column 6) for metric differences resemble the outcomes
of the multinomial logit models for the most part. The higher the number of different
income components in the household, the lower the magnitude of under-reporting. This
outcome may also suggest that using a detailed collection of income components to cal-
culate the total household income (vs. a single question) does not affect data accuracy very
much. The higher the satisfaction with the household income is, the lower the magnitude of
under-reporting. The same applies if the main income source of the household is either
self-employment or private resources (in comparison with old-age benefits as reference
category). Housework or being in education as the main activity status of the respondent
person for the household questionnaire and changes in labor status are associated with
higher income differences. Contrary to expectations, the number of household members
with more than one employment activity in the survey year has a negative effect on under-
reporting. Households where the response person was unemployed for most of the income
reference period have a significantly higher amount of under-reporting than households
with the response person working full-time. Finally, when looking at variables closely
related to the interview procedure itself, we do not find any relationship of the dependent
variable with CATI. In contrast to the multinomial logit, the effects of the number of proxy
interviews are not significant anymore.
Table 2 continued
















N (Households) 6074 2448 2448 6074 3546 3546
* p\ 0.05, ** p\ 0.01, *** p\ 0.001. a scale from 1 to 6; 1 = very unhappy, 6 = very happy. b Self-
reported labor status in income reference period for 2010 for more than 6 months. c scale from 1 to 5;
1 = very good 5 = very bad
Multinomial logit regression models using sampling weights: Coefficients of the model are estimated at
once. Sample size in col. (1) and (4) refers to the sum over all 3 categories of the dependent variable.
Coefficients show odds ratios. Odds For the dependent variable, the reference category refers to households
with a difference between equivalised household incomes that lies within the range of ±5%. Standard errors
(not displayed) account for complex stratified survey design. Pseudo R2 measures are not available for
Maximum Likelihood estimation as the assumption of observations being independent and identically
distributed (iid) is not fulfilled. MPH: Multiple person household. Epinc was used in log form after com-
paring the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria
OLS regression models using sampling weights: Dependent variable is epincdelta (quest. minus register).
Standard errors (not displayed) account for complex survey design (strata = federal states). Age squared
and epinc squared were only included in a model if the Wald test was significant
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4.1.2 Positive Deviations (Over-Reporting)
Both the likelihood of over-reporting (compared to a close identity of incomes) and the
magnitude of over-reporting significantly decrease with rising income. For instance, a one
percent increase in equivalised household income lowers the odds of reporting a higher
income than actually found in administrative records by a factor of 0.244 (Table 2, column
1). A one percent increase in personal income lowers the difference by roughly 0.5 percent
(column 3). In absolute terms (€), the relationship between income from registers and the
magnitude of over-reporting is negative and marginally non-linear, i.e. the effect size
slightly decreases with rising income (column 2).
In contrast to under-reporting, various significant effects are also found for other
income-related variables. A one unit increase in satisfaction with household income is
generally associated with a small but statistically significant increase in the odds of over-
reporting (column 1) and a significant increase in the magnitude of over-reporting (col-
umns 2, 3). If the main income source of the household is private resources (as compared
with old-age benefits as the reference category) this raises the difference between data
sources substantially (9869.80 €). Smaller significant positive effects are also found if
income from employment or social transfers is the main income source. In contrast, to what
was expected in Sect. 3.1, a rising number of different income components in the
household decreases the absolute difference in the case of over-reporting.
Similar to the models for under-reporting, changes in household members’ labor status
during the income reference period slightly increase the odds of over-reporting. Moreover,
households where the response person was unemployed or in education most of the time
during the income reference period, have a significantly lower amount of over-reporting
than households with the response person working full-time (column 2, 3).
Variables related to the interview context do not seem to strongly influence the outcome
variable. A statistically significant but rather weak positive effect on the odds of over-
reporting was only found for the sum of proxy interviews in the household (column 1 & 4).
CATI is not significant.
Taking together all model results for over-reporting and under-reporting three main
conclusions can be drawn. First, income effects are as expected and also mirror the
descriptive analysis: the magnitude of under-reporting rises with increasing income,
whereas an opposite correlation can be found for over-reporting. However, the latter
statistical relation is weaker in magnitude when compared with under-reporting. Second,
for the OLS models (col. 2, 3, 5, 6) a generally higher model fit is observed for under-
reporting. Third, variables related to the interview context play only a very modest role in
explaining the dependent variables.
In a final step, we exploit the panel dimension of our dataset. 28.1% of all households in
the unbalanced panel sample (at least 1 participation 2008–2011) have a mix of both
positive and negative deviations from their equivalised household income as derived from
administrative records. 28.5% have only positive deviations and 41.3% have only negative
deviations. 2.1% have complete conformity for their equivalised household income from
both data sources over their observation period. All panel regression models are estimated
at the household level and control for time-constant unobservable household characteris-
tics. The primary focus is on the effects of income and time (‘learning effect’; i.e. whether
the difference between survey data and administrative data on average decreases over
time). Due to space limitations we cannot comment in detail on the outcomes for other
model variables. The panel models (Table 6, ‘‘Appendix’’) provide additional evidence for
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the U-shaped relationship between equivalised household income and both the absolute
and the logarithmic differences between survey and register data. Furthermore, we now see
evidence for a learning effect, which was less pronounced in the cross-sectional analysis.
There are fewer significant effects for other model variables, which may be partly due to
the short observation period of only 4 years and the low with-in variation (resulting in
higher standard errors for the estimates).
4.2 How Changes in the Distribution of Equivalised Income and Its
Components Affect the Poverty Rate
Table 3 shows that the poverty rate is persistently underestimated in all four years if based
on survey data. Except for 2011, there is also an increase in the poverty gap (distance of the
median income of the poor to the poverty threshold as percentage of the threshold) of 3–4
percentage points. Furthermore (not shown in Table 2), longitudinal poverty (4 times poor
out of 4 times 2008–2011) also increases from 4.8% to 7.1%. As the poverty rate is
calculated based on total household income, changes in its distribution translate directly
into changes in the poverty rate. The Gini coefficient and the relation of the income at the
90th percentile to the 10th percentile indicate that total household income inequality
increases if registers are used. Both the median and mean incomes are slightly higher.
Except for 2008, the total income found in registers also varies more, as indicated by the
standard deviation. Furthermore, Fig. 2 shows that there is more probability mass at the
lower end of the distribution based on register data. Taken together, this evidence indicates
that the rise in the aggregate poverty rate is in part explained by a higher number of
households with a very low income than in the survey data.
By definition, household income, the poverty threshold and the sample weights deter-
mine the poverty rate in arithmetical terms. The left panel of Fig. 3 illustrates the effect of
changing the data source from surveys to register for either only the poverty threshold (red
Table 3 Poverty indicators and the distribution of equivalised household income for different data sources
2008 2009 2010 2011
Survey Reg. Survey Reg. Survey Reg. Survey Reg.
Poverty indicators
% At risk of poverty 12.4 15.2 12.0 14.5 12.1 14.7 12.6 14.5
Poverty threshold, € 11,406 11,648 11,931 12,281 12,371 12,635 12,791 12,878
Poverty gap, % 15.3 19.9 16.9 19.2 17.2 21.8 19 19.1
Equivalised income
Gini 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27
p90p10 3.146 3.383 3.057 3.268 3.185 3.457 3.087 3.330
Mean 21,381 21,679 22,098 22,750 23,158 23,596 23,642 23,922
Median 19,011 19,413 19,886 20,469 20,618 21,058 21,319 21,463
SD 13,739 12,783 11,786 13,501 12,736 14,654 13,525 13,561
Weighted data. Poverty Gap = (median income of the poor - poverty threshold)/poverty threshold 9 100.
Persons are units of observation
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bar) or both household income and the threshold (green bar). This is compared to a
baseline where both income and the calculation of the threshold is based on survey data
(blue bar). The red reference line marks the ‘‘old’’ poverty rate calculated with both sample
weights and income data from surveys. If nothing else except the source for the sample
weights is changed (compare c to b), the poverty rate decreases by less than one percentage
point. A similar conclusion but with a different direction of change can be drawn for the
Fig. 2 Weighted data. Histogram for the distribution of equivalised household income (2010). Red
line = poverty threshold (€). Top 1% excluded for better readability. Persons are units of observation
Fig. 3 Poverty rates (1 = 100%) for 2010 based on income components and/or weights from different data
sources. The red reference line represents the poverty rate if both income data and the poverty threshold are
derived from surveys (12.2%). Persons are units of observations
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poverty threshold (compare blue to red bar within a, b, c). In contrast, irrespective of
sampling weights, altering the data source for household income leads to marked upsurges
in the poverty rate of 2.5–3 percentage points (compare blue to green within a, b, c).
The right panel (d) of Fig. 3 simulates the effects of a change from survey data to
register only for single income components. Such a change leads to a different household
income and subsequently alters the overall distribution of all household incomes including
the median and poverty threshold in a given year. Each bar thus represents the poverty
share in the population based on a corresponding new poverty threshold. Changing the
source for income from employment clearly has the greatest effect on the poverty rate.
Given that 58% receive this type of income (Table 1) this is a predictable outcome.
Moreover, family/children-related allowances and old-age benefits also noticeably increase
the aggregate poverty rate, whereas sickness benefits and disability benefits decrease the
poverty rate if derived from registers.
As changes in the poverty rate are strongly driven by differences in employment
income, the question arises whether the differences measured between data sources
themselves are particularly sizeable with regard to this income component. Rows (a) and
(b) of Table 4 contain descriptive statistics on the distribution of differences among par-
ticular income components after the change from survey to register data. Differences are
grouped with respect to poverty status changes due to the data switch. Those who enter
poverty clearly over-report their employment income with a higher magnitude (&90%)
than those who exit poverty (&-25%), both in absolute and relative terms. Moreover, we
find relative differences of similar magnitude for old-age benefits. Those who are newly
classified as poor based on register data also have a markedly higher share of family
benefits as part of total household income (row c). Furthermore, the median relative
distance of the new equivalised income to the new poverty threshold (not shown in
Table 4) is 17.5% for households switching from poor to non-poor and -18.8% for



















Exit -4151.7 -2819.50 -310.5 -2890.9 0.0





Exit -29.1 -24.8 -9.0 -21.6 0.0
Enter 76.6 89.9 -9.9 48.1 1.0
(c) Median (%): sum
of this
component in




Exit n.a. 49.8 20.3 68.6 16.1
Enter n.a. 53.4 19.0 93.4 30.3
(a), (b) observations with zero income in both survey and register are excluded. n.a., not applicable; HH,
household. Persons are units of observations
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households switching from non-poor to poor, whereas the median relative distance of the
old equivalised income to the new threshold amounts to -13.6% for the exits and 25.3%
for the entries.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Additional checks and analysis beyond our main models deal with (1) the robustness of the
cross-sectional models’ results for the other three available years, (2) several specification
tests concerning the functional form and (3) a comparison of register data against a single
survey question on total household income available in the questionnaire. Detailed results
of all these estimations beyond the summary in this section are provided in the online
supplementary materials.
Overall, repeating the estimation of the main models (Table 2) for the remaining three
years 2008, 2009, 2011 again reveals that both the odds and magnitude of under-reporting
generally rise with increasing income, whereas an opposite correlation can be found for
over-reporting. However, the latter statistical relation is less robust over time (sometimes
insignificant) and weaker in magnitude when compared with under-reporting: there are
small negative effects for income which, however, are only statistically significant in 2010
and 2011. Using logarithmic values for the magnitude of measurement error (dependent
variable) and income from register data (independent variable) instead of levels does not
substantially change the statistical significance and direction of parameter estimates for the
explanatory variables. However, the OLS models with logarithmic values of under-re-
porting and income yield lower fit statistics for all years except in 2011 as compared to the
specifications in levels.
A series of specification tests were applied to validate the robustness of the main results
reported in Table 2. First, Box-Cox transformations (dependent variable) were used to
check whether the OLS regression model for the dependent variable is better in logs than in
levels (Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chapter 8.5.2, boxcox command in STATA). Second,
J-tests and Cox-Pesaran tests for non-nested OLS models were applied to choose between
income on the right-hand side of the equation to be specified in logs or in levels (nnest
command in STATA, see Greene (2000): 302–305). This procedure did not yield com-
pletely unambiguous results. However, for positive differences (survey[ register), it
generally indicated that models with the left-hand side income variables measured in levels
and measured the right-hand side income variables measured in logs may suit the data
better than using models with levels for both. We are also aware of potential problems in
log–log models due to heteroscedasticity (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). Consequently, we
also estimated Poisson regression models, which are suggested as one solution for this
problem (Martinez-Zarzoso 2013; Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011; Silva and Tenreyro
2006). In sum, substantial results of our study are robust to these tests and do not crucially
depend on the functional form of the regression model.
Finally, some studies have shown that measurement error can be of different magnitude
whether total household income is calculated based on a single survey question or
aggregated based on multiple income questions. Using data for the UK, Hansen and Kneale
(2013), find that households with more diverse sources of income, such as the self-em-
ployed, part-time employed and those in receipt of means-tested benefits, were more likely
to report higher incomes when using multiple income questions compared to using a single
question. A study on behalf of Eurostat (Dia et al. 2013) concluded that measurement of
yearly income based on several components is more accurate and complete than current
monthly income.
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The Austrian SILC also contains a single question on current monthly household
income.20 Thus, we checked whether the observed effects of our main models apply to a
lesser or greater extent if register data are compared to this single question on current
monthly household income. To construct the dependent variable, the difference between
this variable (equivalised for household size) and 1/12 of the equivalised annual household
income from register was calculated. For the construction of the dependent variable for the
multinomial logit model, we used the same thresholds as four the model in Sect. 4. The
median of the relative deviation [(survey minus register)/register*100] amounts to amounts
to 25% as compared to 10% when measurement error is calculated as described in
Sect. 3.1. Overall, the estimated effects of income on measurement error have the same
direction and significance as the regression models in Sect. 4.1. A one percent increase in
equivalised monthly household income derived from a single question lowers measurement
error by roughly 0.7% in the case of over-reporting and increase measurement error by
1.6% in the case of under-reporting. Again, a mean-reverting relationship between income
and measurement error is observed.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of substituting survey data with
register data in Austria for income measurement at the household level and how this affects
the poverty rate based on a threshold relative to the median income.
In the multivariate analysis, differences between the two data sources for the same
observations were regressed on income variables, socio-demographic variables and vari-
ables related to the interview context. One the one hand, both the likelihood of under-
reporting and the magnitude (metric differences) of under-reporting significantly increase
with rising income. This outcome is also relatively stable for all of the four years. On the
other hand, the likelihood and magnitude of over-reporting significantly decreases with
rising income. Panel regression results reflect these outcomes and complete the picture of
mean-reverting errors (differences) when measuring disposable household income. Fur-
thermore, a generally higher model fit is observed for under-reporting.
A different question is whether these income effects found are mainly due to cognitive
error or social desirability. Controlling for variables that are correlated with income and the
observed measurement error allows to adjust the observed effect of income on measure-
ment error for those dimensions that are related to cognitive error (e.g. number of income
components, job changes) or other interview effects (e.g. no. of years in the panel). As
there remains a significant effect of income on over-reporting/under-reporting in our
models, this could ceteris paribus be interpreted as evidence that it is primarily social
desirability bias related to the level of income that underlies the observed pattern. How-
ever, effect heterogeneity between income groups is also possible. For instance, even after
controlling for the number of different income sources in the household, cognitive errors
may become increasingly important as income rises. In consequence, this could render the
interpretation of the effect size and effect direction more ambiguous for higher-income
groups.
Besides the relationship between income and the measured difference, we also find
evidence for a ‘‘learning effect’’: differences between data sources for both under-reporting
20 Respondents are asked to think of a typical month to address the problem of seasonal effects when asking
for monthly income.
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and over-reporting decrease with the number of panel waves a household has participated
in. Whether this effect occurs because respondents feel less uncomfortable reporting their
income over time or due to better preparation and knowledge of one’s income data over
time, however, does not have a straightforward answer based on the available data. Among
the other variables related to the interview context only the number of proxy interviews
(weakly) increases the odds of under- and over-reporting.
Finally, the analysis reveals a quite significant increase in the cross-sectional poverty
rates for 2008–2011 and the longitudinal poverty rate if register data are used, whereas
central measures of equivalised household income remain rather unchanged. The income
distribution becomes more uneven when using register data. At the lower tail of the
distribution the median income increases, whereas the opposite is true for the upper tail of
the income distribution. Using register data also results in a higher number of households
with a very low income as compared to survey data. Overall, the observed changes in the
poverty rate are mainly driven by differences in employment income rather than sampling
weights and other income components. Solely changing the source for the sample weights
has only a very moderate effect.
Further research endeavors could test the implications of these outcomes for poverty
dynamics. For instance, under-estimation of the poverty headcount in the cross-section based
on questionnaire data may lead to a higher rate of households’ mobility into and out of poverty
that is higher than the actual rate. As a consequence, poverty may turn out to be more persistent
based on register data. Moreover, it could be investigated if statistical relationships between
material deprivation indicators available in SILC and income poverty are altered significantly if
register data are used. Further research could also clarify if social desirability is more relevant
for some income types than for others (e.g. social benefits vs. market income).
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Appendix 1: Short Description of Register Data Sources for the Austrian
SILC (cf. Statistics Austria 2014)
Based on the national regulation ‘Einkommens- und Lebensbedingungen-Statistikverord-
nung - ELStV’ the sector-specific personal identifier (bPK) allows an anonymized linking of
survey and administrative data for the sampled individuals (§6). The following list contains a
description of those national registers that were used for collecting income variables.
• Dataset on HV-Qualifications contains entries from Austria’s public social security
register. This record does not include income information, but a number of variables
concerning the social security status or changes in social security status for a given
year, e.g. whether somebody received unemployment benefits, disability benefits etc
(2008–2011).
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• Wage Tax Dataset contains information on all taxable earnings; mainly employee
earnings, pension income (retirement benefits), paid maternity leave (8 weeks before
and after expected birth date) and sickness benefits. The data set contains information
on gross income, paid social security contributions and payroll taxes paid. It thus
allows the calculation of the respective net earnings. Moreover, the wage tax
dataset also comprises care allowances, although they are not taxable in Austria. In
sum, the wage tax dataset delivers roughly 75% of the total household income in EU-
SILC (2008–2011).
• Pension dataset data on old-age benefits received from the public pension system. This
dataset is also a source for income target variables other than PY100 (2008–2011).
• Tax adjustment dataset total repayments or receipts for tax adjustment in a given year
for employee earnings (irrespective for how many years the tax was adjusted)
(2008–2011).
• Transfers dataset data on unemployment benefits (on a daily basis); the dataset also
contains the beginning and ending date of unemployment spells (=beginning and
terminating of benefits) (2008–2011).
• Dataset on family allowances information on family/children-related allowances. A
differentiation with respect to the number of children or other characteristics of the
children (disabilities) is not possible. One total sum for each bPK-AS is provided
(2008–2011).
• Dataset for benefits to accident victims and surviving dependents (2010 and 2011).
Appendix 2
See Table 5.
Table 5 Equivalised household income (EPINC): differences between data sources
% 2008 2009 2010 2011
EPINC_quest = EPINC_reg 1.8 1.4 1.4 10.4a
[EPINC_quest/EPINC_reg] 9 100 = in the range of ±5% 27.4 29.2 29.8 36
2 =\[EPINC_quest/EPINC_reg][ 1.05 28.7 26.4 25.4 20.1
0.5 =\[EPINC_quest/EPINC_reg]\ 0.95 35.9 36.8 37.5 29.4
[EPINC_quest/EPINC_reg][ 2 4 3.9 3.9 2.5
[EPINC_quest/EPINC_reg\ 0.5] 2.1 2.3 2 1.5
Total (%) 100 100 100 100
N (Households) 5707 5876 6188 6187
Weighted data. Households are units of observation
EPINC_reg equivalised household income from registers, EPINC_quest equivalised household income from
questionnaire
a The higher overlap in 2011 is in part due to the fact that old age benefits were already drawn from registers
in the primal data collection round






Fig. 4 Median and mean of the difference between data sources if equivalised household incomes are
measured in logs. Differences displayed for 20 quantiles of equivalised household income derived from
registers (2010). Weighted data
Table 6 Results from panel regression models (four rounds 2008–2011) with household fixed effects
Dep. var. is epincsurvey minus epincregister Levels Logs
Unbalanced Balanced Unbalanced Balanced
Equivalised income: Lowest 5% 2789.6*** 3455.5*** 0.623*** 0.645*
10% percentile 362.2 1001.4 -0.137 -0.0259
15% percentile -392.9 474.2 -0.153 -0.316
20% percentile -141.6 84.01 -0.102 -0.212
25% percentile -107.3 741.8 -0.169 0.0488
30% percentile 28.09 290.4 -0.124 -0.0205
35% percentile -56.75 760.2 -0.125 0.147
40% percentile -83.13 1141.7* -0.141 0.204
45% percentile -52.16 545.3 0.0269 0.223
Differences Between Household Income from Surveys and…
123
Table 6 continued
Dep. var. is epincsurvey minus epincregister Levels Logs
Unbalanced Balanced Unbalanced Balanced
50% percentile Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
55% percentile 435.8 1139.8** 0.0802 0.153
60% percentile 643.6* 318.9 0.0977 0.203
65% percentile 915.2** 1171.1 0.249** 0.430*
70% percentile 1002.7** 1007.9 0.151 0.182
75% percentile 1341.0*** 1689.1* 0.171 0.440*
80% percentile 1719.5*** 2128.5* 0.367*** 0.466*
85% percentile 2577.3*** 2921.1** 0.495*** 0.709***
90% percentile 4314.4*** 4498.0** 0.705*** 0.916***
95% percentile 5704.8*** 5858.0*** 0.832*** 1.130***
Top 5% 13600.1*** 11,561.7*** 1.340*** 1.533***
HH Satisfaction w. household income (median)a 72.55 40.31 0.0276 0.00866
Main income: employed 1376.6 763.1 -0.490** -0.467
Main income: self-employment -3354.6** -1941.5 -0.814*** -0.983*
Main income: social transfers 289.1 1181.1 -0.850*** -0.617
Main income: old-age benefits Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
Main income: other -1082.7 -2086.8 -0.496* -0.602
Total no. of different income components -87.99 -137.0 -0.0620*** -0.0412
Activity statusb: full time Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
Activity status: part time -70.30 -1076.9 -0.0134 -0.135
Activity status: unemployed -548.0 -1205.7 -0.0246 -0.0890
Activity status: retired 329.0 -171.1 -0.165 -0.223
Activity status: student, school, other 215.6 410.0 0.148 0.256
Activity status: housework -428.5 -230.0 -0.0388 0.0546
No. hh members[15 with[1 employment 47.44 -541.4 0.0712 0.0305
0 employment status changes Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
1 employment status change 319.6 426.5 0.183*** 0.182*
[1 employment status changes 693.6 1223.7 0.210* -0.0368
Household sickness (median)c -141.7 -90.97 0.0196 0.00281
Education: basic Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
Education: middle 168.0 362.7 0.0843 0.116
Education: high -12.68 327.2 0.0721 0.0598
Education: specialized -688.0 1045.0 -0.0125 0.0766
Retired household 566.4 933.1 -0.00615 -0.104
Single household, not retired -213.4 -911.5 -0.733*** -0.838***
Multiple person household no children Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
Single parent household -397.7 564.6 -0.427** -0.276
Multiple person household w. children -309.7 -412.5 -0.00490 -0.204
Region: Vienna (capital city,[1,000,000 inh.) Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat
[100,000 inhab. 6506.7 407.5 0.217 -0.179
[10,000 inhab. 5444.5 1255.9 -0.0349 -0.604
B10,000 inhab. 6534.1 1520.7 0.0496 0.394
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